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4THE SHADOW OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN:
SIDESHADOWING IN THUCYDIDES
AND XENOPHON
Lisa Irene Hau
It is a common observation that the difference between narrative and
reality is the fact that narrative is structured. It has a beginning and an end,
placed at meaningful moments in the story, and at the end the reader feels
a satisfied sense of closure because the whole, when looked at from the
vantage point of the end, displays a complete and unified structure. In this
type of hindsight, the reader is usually able to identify certain themes with
which the narrative has been concerned. Life, on the other hand, is messy.
It has a natural beginning and end point, but they often do not happen at
any meaningful points in any ‘story’, and what comes in between is not
necessarily structured or concerned with any identifiable themes. Life does
not have a plot.
Another difference between life and narrative is that narrative can be
shaped by foreshadowing. Foreshadowing, to take the metaphor seriously,
allows the future to cast a shadow into the present, thus giving the
characters populating the present – or at least the reader of their story – an
inkling of what is going to happen in the future. In real life the future
cannot be felt so tangibly; we do not go around our daily lives plagued by
foreshadows of the waterpipe that is going to leak and flood our house
next week, the affair that is going to end our marriage next year, or the
death of a loved one some time in the future.
This discrepancy between narrative and life has been pointed out
forcefully by the narratologist Gary Saul Morson. He argues that
foreshadowing can only happen in a ‘closed temporality’ where the future
is predetermined; that foreshadowing is only possible if the future has
already been decided, i.e. if there is only one possible future.
Foreshadowing, he argues, is an example of ‘backwards causation’, where
some features of the present are caused by the future, not by the past. This
regularly happens in literature, where both the ending and the way to get
there have been pre-determined by the author, but in order to believe in
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foreshadowing in real life, you would need to be a predeterminist or fatalist
(Morson 1994).
This is all very convincing, even obvious, when pointed out in this
manner. However, it seems to relate exclusively to fiction rather than to
historiography. Surely, no one uses foreshadowing in a serious historical
narrative? Well, foreshadowing as such may not be a staple of
historiography, but many historiographers nevertheless write about the
past as if there had always only been one possible outcome – namely the
present – and as if the people living in the past should have known what
was going to happen. We could call this ‘hindsight as foresight’; Morson
borrows a term fromMichael André Bernstein and calls it ‘backshadowing’
(Bernstein 1994). The phenomenon is linked with the tendency to write
teleological historiography as if the past had been a linear process towards
one specific goal. Such history has been written consciously by ideological
historians from Neo-classicists to Marxists and Liberalists and has been
vividly criticised in the past,1 but even many historians who have tried to
write about the past objectively have inadvertently fallen into the trap of
expressing themselves as if what happened in the past was the only thing
that could happen. This can happen out of whatMorson terms chronocentrism,
the tendency unconsciously to regard our own time as somehow privileged
and ‘right’ in terms of knowledge, attitudes, opinions, and prejudices –
or it can be an inadvertent by-product of turning history into narrative,
because narrative almost automatically imposes not just a beginning,
a middle, and an end on the historical events it narrates, but also
themes, plots, and subplots, all of which only emerge in the clarity of
hindsight.2
So, how can we avoid applying such hindsight to history? Morson’s
answer is the invention of the concept sideshadowing. Whereas foreshadowing
allows the future to ‘cast a shadow’ into the present and so allows
the reader some degree of knowledge about what is yet to happen,
sideshadowing allows possible alternative presents to ‘cast shadows’ into
the narrative’s actual present and allows the reader some degree of
knowledge about what might have been. The advantage of this technique,
Morson argues, is a closer approximation of the narrative to reality, where
the future is never set in stone and every moment offers a myriad of
different possible futures, of which only one will be realised.3
One type of sideshadowing in historiography is counterfactual history.
By writing about what did not happen, but might as well have happened,
some modern historiographers have shown the importance of the choices
made and the coincidences realized in pivotal historical situations and so
have forced the reader to become aware of the ease with which history
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could have gone in a different direction.4 However, such elaborate accounts
tend to acquire a life of their own and develop into entertaining showpieces
without saying much about what it actually felt like to live in that specific
time with the uncertainty of the future – in Greece on the eve of the Battle
of Salamis or in Italy just before the Battle of Actium. More subtle
techniques of sideshadowing seem to be needed. I believe we can see such
techniques being employed by some of the ancient historiographers.
Before examining these, however, I want first to exemplify the opposite,
namely ancient historiographers who write backshadowing accounts on
the basis of chronocentrism.
One such backshadowing ancient historiographer is Polybius. He has
often been criticised for judging historical characters according to their
level of success so that the successful are praised for their foresight and skill
at planning while the unsuccessful are censured for their shortsightedness
and carelessness.5 Arthur Eckstein (1995) has shown that this description
of Polybius’ practice is too black and white and that Polybius also applies
criteria such as honour and dignity when judging the characters of his
Histories, but it remains true that his work is characterised by hindsight, by
backshadowing rather than sideshadowing. A typical example is this
passage:
Σχεδὸν δὴ πάντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς περὶ τούτων ἡµῖν τῶν πολιτευµάτων
παραδεδώκασι τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φήµην, περί τε τοῦ Λακεδαιµονίων καὶ Κρητῶν
καὶ Μαντινέων, ἔτι δὲ Καρχηδονίων· ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ
Θηβαίων πολιτείας πεποίηνται µνήµην. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτας µὲν ἐῶ, τὴν γὰρ
Ἀθηναίων καὶ Θηβαίων οὐ πάνυ τι πολλοῦ προσδεῖσθαι πέπεισµαι λόγου διὰ
τὸ µήτε τὰς αὐξήσεις ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ λόγον µήτε τὰς ἀκµὰς ἐπιµόνους, µήτε
τὰς µεταβολὰς ἐνηλλαχέναι µετρίως, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐκ προσπαίου τινὸς τύχης
σὺν καιρῷ λάµψαντας, τὸ δὴ λεγόµενον, ἔτι δοκοῦντας ἀκµὴν καὶ µέλλοντας
εὐτυχεῖν, τῆς ἐναντίας πεῖραν εἰληφέναι µεταβολῆς.
Nearly all historiographers who have written about these constitutions have
reiterated their reputation for excellence; I mean the constitutions of Sparta,
Crete, and Mantineia as well as Carthage. Some have also mentioned the
ones of Athens and Thebes. I for my part am willing to admit the excellence
of the three former, but I am absolutely convinced that the constitutions of
Athens and Thebes do not deserve prolonged mention because they did
not evolve in a rational manner, did not attain lasting power, and did not
undergo change moderately. Rather, suddenly, when some kind of fortune
had shone on them, so to speak, at an opportune time, while they still
seemed powerful and people thought they would remain successful, they
experienced a complete reversal. (Polybius 6.43)6
Polybius goes on to argue in some detail that the power of Athens and
Thebes was due to a few remarkable individuals and disappeared with their
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deaths. What is striking is the complete lack of acknowledgement that
things could have turned out differently, that Athens or Thebes could have
continued victorious, and perhaps even gone on to conquer as much of
the world as the Rome of Polybius’Histories. The very real power of Athens
and Thebes is described as µὴ κατὰ λόγον, ‘irrational’, apparently because it
was brief – seen in hindsight – and ended violently. There is no attempt at
imagining how formidable that power must have seemed to contemporaries
or to explain its downfall. From the vantage point of the 2nd century BC the
hegemony of both states seemed destined to be shortlived, and the
historiographer and his reader can shake their heads pityingly at the fact
that the people living in the 4th century had not foreseen the reversals of
their fortunes.
Conversely, from Polybius’ vantage point the world domination of
Rome seems the only possible outcome of the past. Witness this famous
passage from his preface:
τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἡµετέρας πραγµατείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυµάσιον τῶν καθ᾽ ἡµᾶς
καιρῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτι, καθάπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουµένης
πράγµατα πρὸς ἓν ἔκλινε µέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἕνα καὶ τὸν
αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ µίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς
ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισµὸν τῆς τύχης, ᾧ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων
πραγµάτων συντέλειαν.
The special feature of my work and the amazing fact of our times is that, just
as tyche¯ has made almost the whole world lean towards one destiny and has
forced everything to incline towards one and the same end, in the same way
it is necessary through my history to create an overview for my readers of
the manipulation of affairs which tyche¯ has used to accomplish the
consummation of her whole plan. (Polybius 1.4.1)
I have argued elsewhere (Hau 2011) that Polybius’ use of tyche¯ in this
passage does not mean that he subscribed to a religious belief in Fate.
Nonetheless, there is an inescapable sense of telos: just as ‘almost the whole
world’ (ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουµένης πράγµατα) is now leaning towards Rome,
the reader senses that every event in the past has been one step in the long
process towards Roman world dominance. It is an interesting, but
ultimately unanswerable, question whether Polybius did this on purpose:
if asked, would he have argued that Roman hegemony over the known
world had been inevitable? Or did he fall into the trap of chronocentrism
inadvertently?
Whatever Polybius’ level of consciousness about the issue, historio-
graphers of Rome’s rise to power seem to have been especially prone to
such chronocentric backshadowing. An obvious example is this passage
from the preface of Livy:
Lisa Irene Hau
74
78915_Hindsight_Book:Layout 1  21/10/13  08:54  Page 74
ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos
viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit; labente
deinde paulatim disciplina velut desidentes primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis
magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora, quibus nec vitia
nostra nec remedia pati possumus, perventum est.
I would like each reader individually to turn his mind to the following: what
life, what customs, through what men and by what methods, both at home
and in war, the empire was created and increased; then, when discipline
begins to slip, let him first follow in his mind the, as it were, downward
spiralling customs, then notice how they slip more and more and then go
into free fall, until it has come to these times where we cannot stand either
our vices or their remedy. (Livy Praefatio 9)
The slippery slope of increasingly corrupt morals is presented as inexorable,
the grim outcome as inevitable once the slippage had begun. Admittedly,
this is an extremely rhetorical passage from Livy’s showpiece preface, and
any added sideshadows, any suggestions that the corruption might have
been halted somewhere along the way, would have detracted from its
impact. Nevertheless, it is symptomatic of Livy’s approach to
historiography. In his work, even counterfactuals are used to show that
history really could have gone no other way. Witness this passage relating
to the beginning of the Second Punic War:
His anxius curis ita se Africo bello quod fuit sub recentem Romanam pacem per quinque
annos, ita deinde nouem annis in Hispania augendo Punico imperio gessit ut appareret
maius eum quam quod gereret agitare in animo bellum et, si diutius vixisset, Hamilcare
duce Poenos arma Italiae inlaturos fuisse quae Hannibalis ductu intulerunt. Mors
Hamilcaris peropportuna et pueritia Hannibalis distulerunt bellum.
Upset by these troubles he [Hamilcar] conducted himself in the AfricanWar
(which took place for five years immediately after the conclusion of peace
with Rome) and then for nine years in Spain while the Carthaginian
dominion was spreading, in such a way as to make it clear that he was
planning a war bigger than any in which he was presently engaged, and that,
if he had lived longer, the Carthaginians would have taken the invasion,
which they actually carried out under Hannibal, to Italy with Hamilcar as
their commander. The premature death of Hamilcar and the youth of
Hannibal postponed the war. (Livy 21.2.1)
So, if Hamilcar had lived longer, he would have attacked Italy himself – in
fact, he would have taken exactly the same war to Italy as Hannibal eventually
did. The only difference would have been in the commander, everything
else would have turned out just the same. This complete confidence in the
privileged status of the historiographer’s own particular present can be
seen even more stunningly in a passage famous for being our only ancient
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example of sustained counterfactual history: Livy 9.17–18 speculating on
what would have happened if Alexander the Great had lived to attack
Rome.7 The passage is too long to quote here in its entirety, so I have
included only its beginning:
tamen tanti regis ac ducis mentio, quibus saepe tacitus cogitationibus volutavi animum,
eas evocat in medium, ut quaerere libeat quinam eventus Romanis rebus, si cum
Alexandro foret bellatum, futurus fuerit. Plurimum in bello pollere videntur militum
copia et virtus, ingenia imperatorum, fortuna per omnia humana maxime in res bellicas
potens; ea et singula intuenti et universa sicut ab aliis regibus gentibusque, ita ab hoc
quoque facile praestant invictum Romanum imperium. Iam primum, ut ordiar ab ducibus
comparandis, haud equidem abnuo egregium ducem fuisse Alexandrum; sed clariorem
tamen eum facit quod unus fuit, quod adulescens in incremento rerum, nondum alteram
fortunam expertus, decessit. Ut alios reges claros ducesque omittam, magna exempla
casuum humanorum, Cyrum, quem maxime Graeci laudibus celebrant, quid nisi longa
vita, sicut Magnum modo Pompeium, vertenti praebuit fortunae? Recenseam duces
Romanos, nec omnes omnium aetatium sed ipsos eos cum quibus consulibus aut
dictatoribus Alexandro fuit bellandum, M. Valerium Corvum, C. Marcium Rutulum,
C. Sulpicium, T. Manlium Torquatum, Q. Publilium Philonem, L. Papirium
Cursorem, Q. Fabium Maximum, duos Decios, L. Volumnium, M’. Curium? Deinceps
ingentes sequuntur uiri, si Punicum Romano praevertisset bellum seniorque in Italiam
traiecisset. Horum in quolibet cum indoles eadem quae in Alexandro erat animi
ingeniique, tum disciplina militaris, iam inde ab initiis urbis tradita per manus, in artis
perpetuis praeceptis ordinatae modum venerat.
However, the mention of such a great king and commander prompts me to
express publicly the reflections which I have often turned over in my mind,
and so I want to ask the question what would have happened in Roman
history if Rome had been at war with Alexander [the Great]. What seems to
carry most weight in war is the number and quality of troops, the genius of
the commanders, and fortune, which has power over all human endeavours,
and especially in war. When these factors are considered both individually
and collectively, they guarantee that the Roman empire would easily have
remained unconquered also by him, just as by other kings and peoples.
Now, in the first place, to begin with a comparison of commanders, I do not
deny that Alexander was an exceptional commander. But what made him
especially famous was the fact that he did not have to share his fame, and
that he died while he was still a young man and his power was still growing,
before he could experience adverse fortune. Not to mention other famous
kings or commanders, who offer examples of the changeability of human
fortune, let us take Cyrus, whom the Greeks praise and celebrate: what
delivered him into the hands of changing fortunes if not his long life,
just as happened recently with Pompey? Shall I enumerate the Roman
commanders, not everyone from every age, but only those whom, as consuls
or dictators, Alexander would have had to fight: M. Valerius Corvus,
C. Marcius Rutulus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo,
L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the two Decii, L. Volumnius,
Lisa Irene Hau
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M’. Curius? Some immensely great men follow immediately upon these, if
Alexander had chosen to undertake the war against Carthage first and cross
over to Italy when he was older. In every one of these was found the same
natural ability of heart and mind as in Alexander; and as for military training,
it had been transferred from generation to generation right from the origin
of the city and had been turned into an art-form regulated by eternal rules.
(Livy 9.17)
The passage continues with a detailed argument to the effect that even if
Alexander had lived to attack Rome, he would easily have been defeated.
Thus, nothing about the present would have changed. Rome would have
had one more war to look back on with pride, but apart from that its
history would have run the same course as it did, and the present would
look exactly as it does now. It does not bother Livy that back in the time
of Alexander the Great no one worried much about Rome or whether or
not Alexander might attack it; that question only became interesting when
Rome grew into the greatest warrior nation of the Mediterranean. This
makes the passage not only a stunning piece of chronocentrism, but also
a perfect example of backshadowing, i.e. of projecting the concerns of the
present into the narrated past.
After these examples of backshadowing, chronocentric historiography it is
now time to see how it could be done differently. So we turn to
Thucydides.
On one level, Thucydides is guilty of a certain amount of backshadowing:
he has worked the events of the recent past into a narrative with a
beginning, a clear progression of plot, and some significant themes, all of
which can only be done in hindsight and makes the written account differ
from any lived experience of the period. It is indicative of how much the
past has been narrativized in his account that Hunter Rawlings (1981) on
the basis of the work’s narrative structure felt able to predict how it would
have ended if Thucydides had lived to carry through his plan.8 However,
Thucydides is also the ancient historiographer who most regularly engages
in sideshadowing in order to show that events could, in fact, have turned
out differently. Let us examine some of the sideshadowing techniques he
employs.
One technique is the explicit mention of a potentially different outcome, or
counterfactual statements.9One famous passage falls into this category, namely
the last-minute saving of the Mytileneans from massacre:
καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως µὴ φθασάσης τῆς
προτέρας εὕρωσι διεφθαρµένην τὴν πόλιν· προεῖχε δὲ ἡµέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ
µάλιστα. παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νηὶ οἶνον καὶ
The shadow of what might have been: sideshadowing in Thucydides and Xenophon
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ἄλφιτα καὶ µεγάλα ὑποσχοµένων, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ
τοιαύτη ὥστε ἤσθιόν τε ἅµα ἐλαύνοντες οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιτα πεφυραµένα,
καὶ οἱ µὲν ὕπνον ᾑροῦντο κατὰ µέρος, οἱ δὲ ἤλαυνον. κατὰ τύχην δὲ
πνεύµατος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς µὲν προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ
πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγµα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγοµένης,
ἡ µὲν ἔφθασε τοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψήφισµα καὶ µέλλειν
δράσειν τὰ δεδογµένα, ἡ δ᾽ ὑστέρα αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε µὴ
διαφθεῖραι. παρὰ τοσοῦτον µὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου.
Immediately another trireme was sent out in all haste, since they feared that,
unless it overtook the first trireme, they would find on their arrival that the
city had been destroyed. The first trireme had a start of about twenty-four
hours. The ambassadors from Mytilene provided wine and barley for the
crew and promised great rewards if they arrived in time, and so the men
made such speed on the voyage that they kept on rowing while they took
their food (which was barley mixed with oil and wine) and rowed
continually, taking it in turn to sleep. By chance they had no wind against
them, and as the first ship was not hurrying on its distasteful mission, while
they were pressing on with such speed, what happened was that the first
ship arrived so little ahead of them that Paches had just had time to read the
decree and prepare to carry it out, when the second ship put in to the
harbour and prevented the massacre. So narrow had been the escape of
Mytilene. (Thucydides 3.49.2–3 [translation adapted from Rex Warner])
Everything that makes this narrative dramatic – the mention of what is at
stake both at the beginning of the passage and at the end, the gritty details
of the crew’s efforts to make speed, the repetition of the verb φθάνω, the
explicit statement that they only made it due to the weather, ruled by
tyche¯ – all of this aims to show the reader two things: how easily the events
could have turned out differently, and what that anxiety about the future
felt like for the people involved. There is no hint of hindsight or
backshadowing here; the reader feels transported into that very time when
the crew of the second trireme were exerting themselves in order to catch
up with the first, and with those sailors he feels anxious about the outcome.
When the issue is resolved, we are in no doubt that it might as well have
turned out differently: the Mytileneans might as well have been destroyed
despite the Athenian change of heart; it was only due to human effort and
tyche¯ that they were saved.
The same technique of explicitly pointing out how easily things could
have gone differently is employed in less dramatic fashion in numerous
places throughout Thucydides’ History. A typical example is this brief
passage from the events surrounding the Battle of Amphipolis:
Βρασίδας δὲ ἐβοήθει µὲν τῇ Τορώνῃ, αἰσθόµενος δὲ καθ᾽ ὁδὸν ἑαλωκυῖαν
ἀνεχώρησεν, ἀποσχὼν τεσσαράκοντα µάλιστα σταδίους µὴ φθάσαι ἐλθών.
Lisa Irene Hau
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ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖά τε ἔστησαν δύο, τὸ µὲν κατὰ τὸν λιµένα,
τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῷ τειχίσµατι, καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων γυναῖκας µὲν καὶ παῖδας
ἠνδραπόδισαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Χαλκιδέων
ἦν, ξύµπαντας ἐς ἑπτακοσίους, ἀπέπεµψαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας· καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ µὲν
Πελοποννήσιον ὕστερον ἐν ταῖς γενοµέναις σπονδαῖς ἀπῆλθε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο
ἐκοµίσθη ὑπ᾽ Ὀλυνθίων, ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς λυθείς.
Brasidas was coming to relieve Torone, but while he was on his way he
heard that it had been captured, and so he turned back, having come forty
stades short of arriving in time. Kleon and the Athenians put up two
trophies, one by the harbour and one by the wall, enslaved the women and
children of the Toroneans, and sent the Toronean men, the Peloponnesians,
and any Chalkidean they found back to Athens. This amounted to 700 men.
Of these, the Peloponnesians were given back later during the truce, and the
rest were exchanged for prisoners taken by the Olynthians, man for man.
(Thucydides 5.3.3–4)
This is a different kind of narrative from the Mytilenean one. It is faster
paced, there are no telling details of food or specific measures taken by
commanders, no intimations of the feelings of any of the participants. The
remark that is interesting for our purposes is ‘he had been about four miles
short of arriving in time’ (ἀποσχὼν τεσσαράκοντα µάλιστα σταδίους µὴ φθάσαι
ἐλθών). Why tell us that in the middle of such a fast-moving narrative of
events? Surely part of the reason is to show how easily things could have
gone differently. If Brasidas had only marched a little faster or been quicker
to set out, he might have reached Torone in time. Then the women and
children of Torone would not have been enslaved, the men would not have
been sent to Athens, and the Athenians would have had less leverage when
negotiating the Peace of Nikias and the prisoner exchange with the
Olynthians. This would certainly have meant a momentous difference in
many individual lives, and might potentially have changed the outcome of
the entire Archidamian War. As opposed to his practice in the Mytilene
passage, Thucydides does not express this alternative outcome explicitly,
but only hints at it. And again the verb φθάνω is used to show the closing
off of alternatives.10
Another sideshadowing technique employed by Thucydides is the
expression of unfulfilled expectations. A famous example of an elaborate
narrative of unfulfilled expectation in indirect speech is the beginning of
book 8 where the Athenians have received the news of the disaster in Sicily:
ἅµα µὲν γὰρ στερόµενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ
ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο· ἅµα δὲ
ναῦς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήµατα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ᾽
ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τούς τε
ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεµίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόµιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν
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Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόθεν
πολεµίους τότε δὴ καὶ διπλασίως πάντα παρεσκευασµένους κατὰ κράτος ἤδη
καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐπικείσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ξυµµάχους σφῶν µετ᾽
αὐτῶν ἀποστάντας.
Both the city and each person in it were oppressed by the loss of so many
hoplites and cavalrymen and particularly of more men of military age than
they saw left living. At the same time they saw that there were not sufficient
ships in the shipsheds, nor money in the treasury, nor rowers for the ships,
and they despaired of surviving the present situation. They believed that
their enemies from Sicily would make a seaborne attack on the Piraeus
because they had already beaten them so soundly, and that the enemies from
nearer by would now redouble their efforts and attack them in force on
both land and sea, and that their allies would revolt and join them.
(Thucydides 8.1.2–3)
The desperateness of the situation is expressed as if it was real: ‘they saw
(ἑώρων, ὁρῶντες)’ the inadequacy of their men, ships, and financial
resources. And yet we know that Athens fought on for another ten years,
often successfully. Scholars have often remarked on this discrepancy and
wondered what Thucydides’ purpose was: was he trying to force the reader
to respect and admire the resilience of the Athenians? Or did he, perhaps,
write this passage early, soon after the event, when he was one of those
who did not believe that Athens would pull through? I would venture a
different explanation. When we as modern historians look at a passage like
this and wonder what on earth was in the author’s mind, we are engaging
in chronocentric backshadowing. We are reading as if the Athenians of
413 should have known that they would be able to fight on and that Sicily was
not going to be their final downfall. In fact, of course, they did not know
this. Some probably thought so, but it is likely that Thucydides is correct
in his assessment of the prevailing atmosphere in Athens at the time.
Moreover, he has attempted to recreate that atmosphere in his writing so
the reader can experience it for himself, thereby learning more fully what
that situation was really like than he possibly could from any backshadowing
account along the lines of two modern works, whose descriptions of this
situation are respectively, ‘The immediate crisis was or was perceived to be
imperial, the threatened break-up of the empire (8.2.2;4). There were some
creaking noises as we shall see, but the break-up did not happen’
(Hornblower 1991, 173) and ‘[Athens’] failure [in Sicily] decided the war,
and thereby determined that Greek history would not go the way of Italian
history’ (Davies 1993, 133).11
The expressions of unfulfilled expectations are not always as elaborate
as here; sometimes they are much briefer, the alternative outcome being
allowed to cast only a quick shadow across the actual outcome.12 This
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example recounts the Athenian reaction to the Spartan foundation of
Herakleia in Trachis:
οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ξυνοικιζοµένης τὸ πρῶτον ἔδεισάν τε καὶ
ἐνόµισαν ἐπὶ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ µάλιστα καθίστασθαι, ὅτι βραχύς ἐστιν ὁ διάπλους
πρὸς τὸ Κήναιον τῆς Εὐβοίας. ἔπειτα µέντοι παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβη· οὐ
γὰρ ἐγένετο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν. αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἵ τε Θεσσαλοὶ ἐν δυνάµει
ὄντες τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων, καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίζετο, φοβούµενοι µὴ σφίσι
µεγάλῃ ἰσχύι παροικῶσιν, ἔφθειρον καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐπολέµουν ἀνθρώποις
νεοκαταστάτοις, ἕως ἐξετρύχωσαν γενοµένους τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάνυ πολλούς.
When this city was founded, the Athenians were first afraid and thought
that it had been established with designs on Euboia because of the short
crossing to Kenaion in Euboia. In the event, however, things turned out
contrary to expectations for them and the city came to pose no threat at all.
The reason was that the Thessalians, who were powerful in this area and on
whose land the city had been founded, were afraid that their new neighbours
would become a major force and therefore kept making destructive raids
on the colonists until they had ground down their previous strength.
(Thucydides 3.93.1–2)
Here, the unfulfilled expectation of the Athenians is given a perfectly
reasonable justification in the position of Herakleia, as opposed to the
actual outcome, which is marked as unexpected – and unexpectable – by
the expression παρὰ δόξαν. This phrase becomes an adjective in late
Classical Greek and is extremely common in the Hellenistic historio-
graphers, but in Thucydides it is only found as a prepositional phrase and
is fairly rare (7 occurrences). In this passage he uses it to show the reader
how what actually happened was not what was most likely to happen, i.e.
how the present we live in is not necessarily the most likely result of the
past that has gone before it.13
Finally, there is the technique of reporting advice which was ignored.A typical
example is the case of Alkidas, the Spartan general sent to help the
Mytilenaeans in their revolt. On his way there he receives reports that the city
has fallen. He then receives this detailed advice from one of his Elean allies:
‘Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσµεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐµοὶ δοκεῖ
πλεῖν ἡµᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχοµεν. κατὰ γὰρ
τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὑρήσοµεν, κατὰ
µὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι
πολέµιον καὶ ἡµῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει µάλιστα οὖσα· εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν
αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἰκίας ἀµελέστερον ὡς κεκρατηκότων διεσπάρθαι. εἰ οὖν
προσπέσοιµεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω µετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡµῖν
ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγµατα’
‘Alkidas and Peloponnesian fellow commanders, I propose that we sail
against Mytilene before we are discovered, just as we are. Most likely, as the
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men have only recently got possession of the city, we shall find their guard
down in many places, on sea especially, where they do not expect that an
enemy might attack them and where our strength especially happens to lie.
Probably their land-army will be dispersed in the various houses carelessly
relaxing now that they have been victorious. So if we were to fall on them
suddenly at night, I expect that with the help of those inside the city, if there
is anyone left alive who is on our side, we might well take the place.’
(Thucydides 3.30.1–2)
Alkidas does not follow the plan, but turns around to sail back to the
Peloponnese, casually executing some captured merchants on the way.
It has been pointed out by others that the level of detail of the advice and
its apparent soundness makes it likely that Thucydides thinks Alkidas
should have acted on it. But I would argue that it is not just there to put
Alkidas in a bad light (although that is doubtless part of its purpose). What
the detailed advice also does is conjure up an image in the reader’s mind of
an alternative fate for Mytilene, one where it was relieved by the Spartans
before the Athenians could even hold the sinister Mytilenaean Debate.
That is, it acts as a sideshadow on the historical reality, showing us what
might have been, alongside what was.14
After this brief overview of sideshadowing techniques, it is time now to
look more systematically at the History of Thucydides in this light. It has
often been argued that one of the characteristics of Thucydides’History is
a narrative where one event follows what has gone before naturally and
inevitably in a way that makes any alternative versions unthinkable, as if there
was no other possible outcome.15The examples given as evidence for this
typically come from Book 1, and it is certainly true that the Archaeologia
and Pentecontaëtia are composed from a strongly chronocentric standpoint
and are streamlined towards one seemingly inevitable endpoint. Such
teleological inevitability is characteristic to a lesser degree of much of
Book 1, where every event, every action, every human choice seems to lead
inexorably to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.16However, I would
argue that different parts of Thucydides’ History are imprinted with
different ‘shadows of time’.While Book 1 is characterised by backshadowing,
which leads to a feeling of inevitability, Books 2–6 and Book 8 are full of
sideshadows: time in these parts of the work is open, life is uncertain, the
possibilities are endless. All of the examples of sideshadowing presented
above come from this part of the History. In book 7, however, where the
Sicilian Expedition turns sour for the Athenians, sideshadowing is replaced
by backshadowing and even foreshadowing, and the result is a feeling of
impending doom.
Jacqueline de Romilly in a famous study (1967, especially pp. 48–49)
analyses in great detail the narrative of the wall-building race between the
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Athenians and Syracusans at the end of Book 6 and beginning of Book 7.
Among other things she shows how Thucydides’ elimination of all but the
most essential events makes the outcome seem necessary, as if that was
the only outcome possible. I am convinced by her analysis, but would like
to add a few observations on the topic of sideshadowing, backshadowing,
and foreshadowing.
When Gylippos first leads the Syracusans into battle against the
Athenians, Thucydides says:
ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑπτὰ µὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη
ἀπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν µέγαν λιµένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ
βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτι ᾠκοδόµουν), τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ
κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβληµένοι
τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡµίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασµένα
κατελέλειπτο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον µὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.
He happened to come at this very moment when seven or eight stades had
already been completed by the Athenians of a double wall down to the
Great Harbour, except for a short section down by the sea (this they were
still in the process of building), and for the other section, from the Circle to
Trogilos and the sea on the other side, stones had already been piled up
alongside; some parts were half-finished, others had been left behind
completed. So narrow was the escape of the Syracusans. (Thucydides 7.2.4)
Why has Thucydides not told the reader about the progress of the
Athenians’ wall earlier? Why are we only told after the Syracusans prevent
them from completing it? The concluding statement ‘So narrow was the
escape of Syracuse’ (παρὰ τοσοῦτον µὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου) echoes
the end of the Mytilene passage quoted above.17 It is a sort of retrospective
sideshadowing, or sideshadowing in hindsight; it does not put us in the
Athenians’ place or allow us to imagine with them their hopes for the
completion of the wall – and not only because it is focalized through the
Syracusans – rather, it allows us the tiniest glimpse of a potentially different
outcome of the events, but only after that potentiality has been closed off
and no longer exists. Such retrospective sideshadowing does not give the
story an air of inevitability exactly, I think, but of completedness, pastness,
unchangeability because it has already happened. It draws attention to the
hindsight with which both the author and the reader contemplate the events
and so emphasizes the fact that they aremere on-lookers, powerless to change
anything in the story that is unfolding before them –much like an audience
spell-bound by the disastrous chain of events in a fifth-century tragedy.18
The air of tragedy and doom in the wall-building passage, and in
Book 7 generally, is enhanced by the use of not sideshadowing, but
foreshadowing. At the moment when the Athenians decide to face the
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Syracusans in battle in order to prevent them from completing their
counter-wall and so destroy any chance the Athenians have of taking
Syracuse, Thucydides describes their thoughts:
ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νοµίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι µὴ ἐθέλοιεν µάχης
ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι µὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδοµούµενον τὸ τεῖχος. ἤδη
γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτὴν ἡ
ἐκείνων τείχισις, καί, εἰ προέλθοι, ταὐτὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε
µαχοµένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ µηδὲ µάχεσθαι, ἀντεπῇσαν οὖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις.
Nikias and the Athenians believed that, if the other side refused to begin
battle, they themselves must not stand by and ignore the completion of the
cross-wall. For this wall now all but passed the end of the Athenian wall
and, if it should proceed beyond it, it would make no difference if they
fought and won continuous battles or did not fight at all. Therefore they
marched out to meet the Syracusans. (Thucydides 7.6.1)
The Athenians are said to imagine a possible and undesirable outcome of
future events, and they then act to prevent this. It is a storyteller pattern
that often functions as a sideshadow: if the Athenians had gone on to be
victorious in the battle, their pre-battle musings would be a powerful
reminder to the reader that the battle had been a pivotal point where things
could have turned out differently and thereby changed the outcome of the
entire war. As it is, the Athenians are defeated in the battle and their
expressed fears come true. What we have, then, is not sideshadowing, but
foreshadowing.
Foreshadowing is a technique that lends itself to the creation of an
atmosphere of inevitable disaster, and in Book 7 Thucydides repeatedly
uses it to this effect.
Let me sum up my reading of Thucydides: Book 7 uses foreshadowing
to create a sense of doom, small doses of sideshadowing to hint at possible
alternative outcomes at the very moment when they are no longer possible,
and teleological backshadowing to make the Athenian disaster seem
inevitable. Book 1, likewise, uses backshadowing to make the outbreak of
the war seem unavoidable. In the middle part of the History, however,
Thucydides’ narrative is characterised by sideshadowing, which highlights
pivotal moments in the narrative – those moments which Stahl (2003) has
called ‘hinges’, and which are pivotal exactly because the result could come
out either way. Stahl argues that these moments held a particular interest
for Thucydides – as they surely do for all historians – and the examples of
sideshadowing provided here confirm this. By employing various
techniques of sideshadowing, Thucydides ensures that, although his
readers know how it is all going to turn out, still, at the same time, we also
read as if things could turn out differently. It is this interplay of inevitability
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and the impossible possibility of an alternative outcome that makes reading
Thucydides such a devastating experience; this is what makes his
historiography feel so close to tragedy.
Before concluding, I would like to show briefly that Thucydides is not
alone among ancient historiographers in using sideshadowing to great
effect. Perhaps surprisingly, Xenophon does it too. Space limitations
prevent me from going into much detail, but a few examples may suffice.
One obvious instance is the end of the narrative of the Battle of Koroneia:
ἐνταῦθα δὴ Ἀγησίλαον ἀνδρεῖον µὲν ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν ἀναµφισβητήτως· οὐ
µέντοι εἵλετό γε τὰ ἀσφαλέστατα. ἐξὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ παρέντι τοὺς διαπίπτοντας
ἀκολουθοῦντι χειροῦσθαι τοὺς ὄπισθεν, οὐκ ἐποίησε τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιµέτωπος
συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις· καὶ συµβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐµάχοντο,
ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνῃσκον. τέλος δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων οἱ µὲν διαπίπτουσι πρὸς
τὸν Ἑλικῶνα, πολλοὶ δ᾽ ἀποχωροῦντες ἀπέθανον. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ µὲν νίκη
’Αγησιλάου ἐγεγένητο, τετρωµένος δ’αὐτoς προσενήνεκτο πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα,
προσελάσαντές τινες τῶν ἱππέων λέγουσιν αὐτῷ ὅτι τῶυ πολεµίων ὡς
ὀγδοήκοντα σὺν ὅπλοις ὑπὸ τῷ νεῷ εἰσι, καὶ ἠρώτων τί χρὴ ποιεῖν. ὁ δέ,
καίπερ πολλὰ τραύµατα ἔχων, ὅµως οὐκ ἐπελάθετο τοῦ θείου, ἀλλ’ ἐᾶν τε
ἀπιέναι ᾗ βούλοιντο ἐκέλευε καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐκ εἴα. τότε µὲν οὖν, καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη
ὀψέ, δειπνοποιησάµενοι ἐκοιµήθησαν.
At this point Agesilaos may undisputedly be called brave; he did not,
however, choose the safest option. For while it was possible for him to let
the men pass who were trying to fight their way through and then to follow
them and attack those in the rear, he instead clashed with the Thebans front
to front. And setting shield against shield they pushed, fought, killed, and
were killed. In the end some of the Thebans fought their way through
towards Mount Helikon, but many others were killed in the retreat. When
the victory had fallen to Agesilaos and he himself, wounded, had been
carried to the phalanx, some of the horsemen rode up and told him that
about eighty of the enemy, with their arms, had taken refuge in the temple,
and they asked him what they should do. And although he had received
numerous wounds, he nevertheless did not disregard the god, but ordered
them to allow the men in the temple to go away to whatever place they
wanted, and did not allow them to commit any wrongs. Then (for it was
already late), they had their evening meal and went to sleep. (Xen. Hell.
4.3.19–20)
There are two instances of sideshadowing in this passage. The first one is
a counterfactual description of Agesilaos’ and the Spartans’ actions in the
battle. By turning the reader’s attention to what Agesilaos did not do,
Xenophon not only shows us the unexpectedness of Agesilaos’ actions,
but also holds up for a moment the possibility that the battle might have
been fought differently and thus, perhaps, might have ended differently.
Similarly, in the second instance of sideshadowing in the passage, the
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information that Agesilaos did not disregard the god makes the reader
contemplate that other possibility for a moment: the wounded Spartan
king ordering his men to cut down the enemy soldiers seeking refuge in the
temple – before returning to the much more serene reality of an evening
meal and sleep. Both instances could be called counterfactuals, or
‘emphasis through negation’, and their primary function is probably to
shed light on Agesilaos’ character. At the same time, however, they cast
sideshadows from an alternative reality into the narrative, and the reader
is left with the sense that events could easily have turned out differently –
if Agesilaos had been a different man from the one he was. Indeed, it is not
hard to imagine that the 80 Boiotian soldiers huddling together in the
temple were debating this very question among themselves: What kind of
man is Agesilaos? Will he storm the temple and attack us? Will he burn it
to the ground? Or will he let us go? The brief sideshadow lets the reader
see the different possibilities, like paths forking out from a single timeline.
Most of the sideshadowing in theHellenika is of this kind.19 It is probably
no coincidence that both Thucydides and Xenophon wrote about events
of their own lifetimes, events in which they themselves had taken part, or
for which they had consulted eyewitnesses. After only a short temporal
gap the possibilities that had been there, but had been closed off when
other choices had been made, were perhaps more visible, more present to
the memory, than for Polybius or Livy looking back over 200 years to the
Theban hegemony or the Second Punic War.
It will be fitting to end with another example from Xenophon, one
where he uses the technique of expressing unfulfilled expectations to great
effect. It is the very last words of theHellenika:
τούτων δὲ πραχθέντων τοὐναντίον ἐγεγένητο οὗ ἐνόµισαν πάντες ἄνθρωποι
ἔσεσθαι. συνεληλυθυίας γὰρ σχεδὸν ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ ἀντιτεταγµένων,
οὐδεὶς ἦν ὅστις οὐκ ᾤετο, εἰ µάχη ἔσοιτο, τοὺς µὲν κρατήσαντας ἄρξειν, τοὺς
δὲ κρατηθέντας ὑπηκόους ἔσεσθαι· ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὕτως ἐποίησεν ὥστε ἀµφότεροι
µὲν τροπαῖον ὡς νενικηκότες ἐστήσαντο, τοὺς δὲ ἱσταµένους οὐδέτεροι
ἐκώλυον, νεκροὺς δὲ ἀµφότεροι µὲν ὡς νενικηκότες ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν,
ἀµφότεροι δὲ ὡς ἡττηµένοι ὑποσπόνδους ἀπελάµβανον, νενικηκέναι δὲ
φάσκοντες ἑκάτεροι οὔτε χώρᾳ οὔτε πόλει οὔτ᾽ ἀρχῇ οὐδέτεροι οὐδὲν πλέον
ἔχοντες ἐφάνησαν ἢ πρὶν τὴν µάχην γενέσθαι· ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι
πλείων µετὰ τὴν µάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. ἐµοὶ µὲν δὴ µέχρι
τούτου γραφέσθω· τὰ δὲ µετὰ ταῦτα ἴσως ἄλλῳ µελήσει.
At the end of this battle, the opposite had happened to that which everyone
had expected. For considering that almost all of Greece had come together
and were ranged against each other, everyone had thought that, if a battle
would take place, the victors would rule and the vanquished would become
their subjects. But the god made it so that both sides set up trophies as if
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victorious, but neither side prevented those who were setting them up, and
both sides granted a truce for the collection of the dead as if victorious, but
both sides also collected their dead under a truce as if defeated. Although
claiming to have won the victory, each side turned out to have no more
land, cities, or power than before the battle took place. There was more
uncertainty and confusion in Greece after the battle than before it. Let the
history up until this point suffice for me; what followed will perhaps be the
task of another. (XenophonHell. 7.5.26–27)
By reporting the expectations of ‘everyone’, Xenophon briefly sets up an
alternative world, where peace reigns, albeit at the price of the domination
of one state over the rest of Greece. The tone of the entire passage is sad
and resigned, and the sideshadow of this other, peaceful reality adds to
that feeling. Instead of such a well-ordered, resolved state of affairs, we
have ‘uncertainty and confusion’ (ἀκρισία καὶ ταραχὴ). In the face of such
inexplicable, meaningless history the narrator throws up his hands and
leaves the continuation of the narrative to someone else. This ending –
along with the non-preface of the work – is immensely effective in showing
the un-narrative character of the past, in demonstrating that history does
not make a neat story.
And on this note we might conclude. History is not the same as story.
Foreshadowing and backshadowing turn the past into a packaged story
much like a novel, with a beginning, middle, end, a plot, and some central
themes. Sideshadowing alerts the reader to possible alternative outcomes,
to that myriad of different futures which were all realisable at some point
in the past. It recreates some of the experience of living in that past andmakes
the reader realize that what is now our past was once someone else’s future,
and as open and unpredictable as the future is today. By being alert to the
restrictions and advantages of these three narrative tools we can understand
ancient historiography better and gain a truer picture of the ancient past.
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Notes
1 Classically by Butterfield 1931.
2 The unavoidable narrativisation of the past when writing historiography has, of
course, been brought to the attention of modern historians by HaydenWhite. See e.g.
White 1987.
3 Sideshadowing has made an appearance in only a few contributions to Classical
scholarship. When I delivered this paper at the Celtic Conference in Classics in
Edinburgh in 2010, I was aware of only two items: Liveley 2008 (on Ovid’sHeroides)
and Pagan 2006 (on Tacitus). Since then has appeared Grethlein 2010, which
(pp. 242–280) discusses Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian Expedition partly in terms
of sideshadowing, thus overlapping somewhat with the middle section of this paper.
However, Grethlein uses the concept only to argue that Thucydides’ narrative
foregrounds ‘the contingency of chance’ as a major factor in history; he does not
discuss differences in this respect between different books of theHistory, and he only
discusses one of the passages analysed in the present paper – in short, our studies
complement each other rather than retread the same ground.
4 See e.g. the very entertaining essays in Ferguson 1998.
5 See e.g. Pédech 1964, Walbank 1972 and 1974, and Sacks 1980. On Polybius and
the general question of hindsight, see the chapter of Felix Maier in the present volume.
6 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
7 For a good close reading of this passage along with a detailed discussion of
scholarship on it and speculation about a ‘tradition of counterfactual boasting’ in
Rome see Morello 2002.
8 Rawlings argues on the basis of a detailed and largely convincing analysis of the
parallels between books 1–3 and 6–8 that Thucydides envisioned a work of 10 books
ending with an ‘Athenian Dialogue’ to mirror the Melian Dialogue.
9 This aspect of Thucydides’ History has been discussed briefly by Dover 1981.
Interestingly, Dover feels the need to defend the existence of counterfactual
statements in Thucydides, and he does so by sensibly stating that ‘We expect a
historian to tell us what matters; and in order to decide what matters, what made the
difference, he needs to pose and answer in his own mind questions about what would
have happened if something had been otherwise’. Dover counts 20 occasions of
counterfactuals in Thucydides’ narratorial voice.
10 Some other examples are: Thuc. 4.54 where Nikias has in secret negotiated with
the Kytherians and now gets them to surrender on favourable terms: ‘Otherwise the
Athenians would have expelled the population of the island, since they were of Spartan
blood and their island lay so close to Laconia’; and 4.106 where Thucydides as a
character in his own History does not arrive in time to save Amphipolis, but saves
Eion: ‘he (Brasidas) was within a night of taking Eion too. If the ships had not arrived
so quickly to relieve it, it would have been in his hands by dawn.’
11 Davies continues: ‘There a dominant power, Rome, imposed its authority,
commanded preponderant resources, and ultimately merged its sovereignty in a larger-
scale entity. Greece was to continue to be polycentric, competitive, spoiling, and
subject to influence and pressure from outside.’
12 Another elaborate example of an expression of unfulfilled expectations as a
means of sideshadowing is 8.96 on the possibility that the Peloponnesians could take
the Piraeus and the entire Athenian empire after the fall of Euboia, used as an example
Lisa Irene Hau
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of an elaborate counterfactual by Dover 1981. Dover discusses in detail 7.42.3, but
with the purpose of deciding whether or not the passage is meant to reflect
Thucydides’ own thoughts rather than with a view to discussing the wider implications
of counterfactuals in theHistory.
13 Another interesting example is 2.83: ‘the Corinthians did not imagine that the
twenty Athenian ships would venture on a battle with their own force of forty-seven
ships’ (translation by RexWarner) – recreating the (lack of ) foresight of contemporaries.
14 Further examples of advice ignored: 3.77 and 3.79. See also 3.113: ‘if the
Akarnanians and Amphilochians had been willing to follow the advice of
Demosthenes and the Athenians and to seize Ambrakia, they could have done so
without striking a blow’ (translation by Rex Warner). As it was, they were victorious,
but caused a major bloodbath.
15De Romilly (1967, 47–48 and 1971) discusses the feeling of inevitability surrounding
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in Thucydides. See also Ostwald 1988.
16 See especially 1.23 with the discussions of de Romilly 1971 and Ostwald 1988
1–5.
17 This repetition is highlighted by Hornblower (1994, 158–9), who describes it as
a rhetorical use of a Homeric/poetic counterfactual.
18 This passage is also briefly discussed by Grethlein 2010 as an example of
sideshadowing in Thucydides, but he does not discuss the sense of inevitability.
19An example isHell.5.4.64: ‘After sailing round the Peloponnese Timotheos went
straight on to Kerkyra and took the island over. However, he did not enslave the
inhabitants nor banish individuals nor change the constitution. The result of this
conduct was to make all the states in that area better disposed towards Athens.’
(translation by Rex Warner)
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